This paper investigates the diversi…cation demand of an agent, who is faced with the alternative to swap aggregate labour-income risk for equity-exposure, through her individual account in a mandatory-pension scheme.
INTRODUCTION
Mandatory pension schemes have recently been a focus of debate for both politicians and academics (cf. Commission to Strengthen Social Security (2001), Shiller (2003a) ). Primarily, probably because of the magnitude of the necessary changes in the di¤erent existing schemes; in order to rectify previously-too much generosity to older generations, either in the form of too small contributions or too large bene…ts; relative to the realisation of the assumptions on which these systems were based; which has created an increasing legacy cost for future generations; but also because of the availability of new cost e¤ective techniques for managing individual accounts; and not the least, because of some important new insights into the risk management of large societal risks, (cf. Shiller (2003a) ). It is to this last reason for attention into mandatory pensions, to which this paper is oriented. Shiller (2003b) argues that:"the time when we redesign social security ought to be the time when we carefully consider the fundamental intergenerational risk-management problem and de…ne choices in individual accounts". The inter-generational risk-management problem, can simplistically be thought of as: how to transfer the risks and the bene…ts between two groups of agents-young and old; where the …rst group disproportionately have human capital and bene…ts from labour productivity; whereas the other is primarily a bene…ciary of owning real capital and receives return from securities, either directly through private savings or indirectly, via mandatory pensions. Albeit, individual accounts are important as a vehicle for creating the appropriate incentives, by connecting contributions with bene…ts; individual accounts, are also motivated by the need to tailor exposure and diversify risks that originate from individual di¤erences; in age, wage uncertainty, implicit insurances, preferences, and assets that the individual may have; cf. Viceira (2001) , who shows that even young individuals may optimally have a lower proportion of risky assets than retireés.
When reforming their pension systems, some countries have introduced a notional-or non-fundedde…ned contribution system (N DC); with individual accounts, and return indexed to wage growth.
This has the bene…t to the retireés of giving them a share of future labour productivity, while distributing the volatility in wages to the entire society. The problem with this type of indexation is that it exacerbates the wage-related risk for the younger generation who are already exposed to too much of this risk in their human capital.
Risk-sharing can be bene…cial for the society in its entirety, Campbell and Nosbusch (2006) found that inter-generational risk-sharing decreased the risk premium. Campbell (2005) discusses a risksharing system, where contributions are negatively correlated with capital returns, which e¤ectively creates a swap-contract between real and human capital. Shiller have in numerous articles (cf. Shiller (1993 ), Shiller (2003a ) advocated the introduction of a swap that pays the domestic aggregate labour income growth in exchange for risk-free or a global labour income growth.
In this paper we propose an N DC system, which allow the individual some freedom of choice in the allocation of the mandatory savings, while keeping the system for contributions intact. We do this by introducing a swap-contract; where the individual, can choose to enter into a swap, that swaps-aggregate labour income growth in exchange for equity return (henceforth-a Shiller-swap), and thereby addressing the inter-generational risk-management problem. Net positions within the N DC system couldportfolio be zero, leaving assets and liabilities in the system unchanged. Allowing the individual to enter into speci…c positions of the Shiller-swap, would assuage the consequences of forcing all individuals into one-size-…ts-all, in terms of risk and returns characteristics of some of their pension assets. To demonstrate the properties of our proposal, we use a model similar to the life-cycle model of Campbell et al, (2001) , (henceforth-CCGM).
Life-cycle models have been used as a tool for explaining the accumulation and distribution of wealth as well as portfolio choice over the life-cycle. For agents with uncertain income and liquidity constraints, savings serve several purposes, e.g. precautionary, retirement and bequest. The importance of each of these motives varies over the life-cycle and will consequently a¤ect both the consumption and portfolio-choice. Over the life-cycle, retirement-savings will typically dominate in absolute size and are to a large extent accumulated in mandatory pension schemes.
In a life-cycle model; the complete market solution, should be to equalise consumption over life throughout an individuals'life while keeping the residual savings in assets (including human capital) optimally diversi…ed. However, adding the constraint of inability to capitalise future income; young individuals will attribute little value to their mandatory pension-savings; since they also face a positive earnings pro…le, (cf. CCGM, Carlsson and Erlandzon (2005) ). Furthermore, young adults will also have a disproportionate exposure to human capital; which is the rationale for our proposal, to use the mandatory savings account in order to create a more balanced portfolio.
Not surprisingly, the largest welfare gains would be achieved by allowing the individual to freely determine, when to save and how to allocate the savings. However, we cannot expect "the market", to solve this problem. The fact that most societies require a system with mandatory savings for pensions among consenting adults, and that such systems have existed in many countries for more than a century; is maybe a tribute to the intuition of past politicians into option theory and behavioral …nance-modern societies will not permit people to consume too much of their income, and then allow the same individuals to rely on society to care for their pension. The individual preferences and perceived insurances that made it necessary for society to introduce the restriction of mandatory savings, will most likely, also reduce the likelihood of these individuals making spontaneously good choices among various investment alternatives. Government has therefore a rôle to play as an administrator of mandatory pensions, but the design of such systems, should minimize the distortions.
We use the Swedish N DC system as a benchmark against which to measure the potential of our proposal. Sweden was the …rst country to introduce an N DC system, where contributions are credited to an individual notional account with a return set to aggregate labour income growth. This reform-initiated 1999; has attracted a lot of interest as a potential blueprint for other countries (cf. Schieber & Shoven (1996); Diamond (2002) , Holzmann & Palmer (2006) ). Furthermore, the relative simplicity and transparency of both the tax and pension systems also facilitates a realistically calibrated model. Finally, Sweden has a unique availability of high-quality register-based data, which alleviates some of the quality problems that would be associated with survey data. While calibrated on Swedish data and rules for taxes and pensions, there are several similarities to systems in other countries, e.g. Italy and xxxxx. This paper has its origin in the literature that highlights uncertainty and market incompleteness as important factors in explaining individual choice and welfare. The …rst papers on this subject came from the consumption literature on bu¤er-stock saving (cf. Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and Friedman (1957) ) and portfolio choice (cf. Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1971) ). Deaton (1991) , Carroll (1997) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002) created life-cycle models with uncertain wages and borrowing constraints. Cocco et al. (2005) and others extended these models with a portfolio choice between a risk-free and a risky asset. In order to analyse the effects of di¤erent pension systems, CCGM added a mandatory pension scheme to the model. They demonstrated a positive welfare e¤ect from a lower pension contribution; due to a postponement of savings until a time when labour incomes are higher. Carlsson and Erlandzon (2005) , showed that the wage-indexation of mandatory savings, exacerbothbates the negative welfare e¤ects, especially early in life.
Our model extends the CCGM-model both by including realistically calibrated tax-and pensionsystems and by an additional choice; i.e. we allow the individual to swap some of the aggregate income exposure within the mandatory pension system for equity-risk and -return. The main contribution of this paper is that: we can identify the age, when the individual would be a buyer or seller of a Shiller-swap and estimate the required risk premium to attract both buyers and sellers. We …nd that the young would be buyers-and then sellers when older-and that this pattern is invariant to individual risk-aversion. Therefore, the objective of societal risk-sharing can be achieved by allowing the individuals to take positions in Shiller-swaps.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model, while Section 3 demonstrates how the model is calibrated. The results are presented in Section 4. Finally, we end with some concluding remarks in Section 5.
THE MODEL

Individual preferences
The individual maximises the expected utility over the adult life-cycle, which is divided into preand post-retirement. "Optimization", starts at the age 2 of 0 (20), retires at a …xed age K(65); and dies at a maximum age of T (100). We assume that the individual has constant relative risk aversion preferences, on a single non-durable consumption good, C .
2 Or at the age of 23, for those with a university degree.
Individual preferences at time m are de…ned as
where C represent consumption at age ; is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, p is the one year age contingent survival probability, is the discount factor, b is the bequest parameter and D is the bequest amount.
Labour income
The labour income process follows Carroll and Samwick (1997) . During working life, the individual experiences idiosyncratic as well as common shocks to gross income. The log labour real income l ik prior to retirement, for an individual i belonging to group k is exogenous; i.e. the individual cannot change her labour supply or education to e.g. accomodate income shocks, and given as
where f k is a function of the individual characteristics 3 Z ik as well as an average national labour productivity growth l , ik is an idiosyncratic temporary shock distributed as N (0; " k ) and v ik is a random walk
The innovation, u ik ; is divided into a group aggregate k N (0; k ); which we allow to be correlated with excess returns in the risky asset, and an individual uncorrelated component ! ik N (0; ! k ) as
Present mandatory savings and retirement bene…ts
Mandatory pension-savings and retirement bene…ts are part of an N DC-system in which 16% of gross pre-retirement income 4 is contributed by the employer and accounted for in individual accounts.
Contributions are capped above an income of 300 KSEK 5 . The return on the accounts-R l is set equal to the national labour income growth, (cf. RFV (2002)).
( 2.6) where P O is the age speci…c annualised mortality-adjusted payout-function after retirement, and l is the expected national labour income growth aggregated over all groups with noise, with 4 An additional contribution of 2:5%, can be managed by the individual in a funded account, for simplicity, we disregard this here. 5 In the following, KSEK -thousands of Swedish Kronor will be omitted. The present exchange rate is circa 7 SEK / USD. 6 In reality it depends on the wage during the …ve years prior to retirement. However, modelling this rule correctly would have necessitated additional state variables. We therefore approximate this by only including the permanent income changes until retirement.
All payouts from the N DC pension plan are forfeited in the event of death and for simplicity, we assume the same for the de…ned bene…t plan.
Taxes
Wage and retirement income L i can be de…ned as
(2.9)
According to current Swedish tax rules, labour income and pension bene…t are taxed at the same rate, and separate from capital income 7 . To calculate net income-L n i ; we …rst deduct a general allowance of 10; then a municipal tax of 30%, a government tax of 20% on all income above 300 and …nally an additional government tax of 5% on income above 450. Net income is bounded below at 60 by the social welfare minimum-bene…t, which also applies to retirees in the form of a governmentguaranteed minimum pension. All the threshold-values that create kinks in tax-rates and bene…ts 8 are indexed to the expected national labour income growthl , except the social welfare minimum bene…t which is kept constant in real terms.
Assets
There is one risky and one risk-free asset with after-tax real log-returns equal to r e and r f respectively. Excess return is de…ned as r e r f = e + ; (2.11)
where the noise-, is correlated with the group aggregate innovation in permanent labour income k , which allows for a group speci…c sensitivity to the risky asset, 
Private savings and consumption
Each individual starts her "optimization life"with initial wealth set to z. In pre-retirement years the individual receives a wage, and in subsequent years the individual will receive retirement bene…ts.
The individual have two control variables: the proportion of cash on hand to consume-; and what proportion of savings-; to allocate to the risky asset. The cash on hand, or disposable wealth, is therefore,
of which consumption is,
There is also constraints for both borrowing and short-sales, 
Mandatory savings with Shiller-swaps
With our proposal, the agent can exchange (buy the contract) the risk and return in their N DC account for equity exposure, through a Shiller-swap. The design of this contract is as follows: …rst, we de…ne the premium-s, to the seller of the contract; in such a way, that if a Shiller-bond existed, with log-return-( l + A + s); (equal to labour income growth plus premium) it would be a non-redundant asset; i.e., attracting an unrestricted (international) investor with power utility, i.e. which determines the exchange multiple-; the ratio by which returns are swapped in a Shillerswap. The reason for this construct is that; we are only interested in the demand for Shiller-swaps due to the di¤erent risk characteristics and not because of di¤erences in expected return,
The individual can now choose-; the proportion of their N DC account they wish to swap.
Consequently the overall return on the N DC account (Equation (2.5)) changes to 
Optimization
The optimization problem therefore has four state-variables ( , v, X and N DC) and three choicevariables ( ; and ); as well as four stochastic variables ( , u, A and ). The value function of the individual intertemporal consumption and investment problem can then be written as
The solution to this problem determines the state-dependent policy-rules
( 2.20) We solve the problem numerically by backward recursion from the …nal year-T , using by-now standard methods, cf. Cocco et al. (2005) and Judd (1998) .
CALIBRATION OF PARAMETERS
Estimation of labour income process
We model individuals rather than households. Our rationale is primarily that: pension contributions and bene…ts are based on individual rather than family incomes; taxes are progressive and only dependent on the individual instead of family incomes. In addition to wages, labour income was de…ned to include all taxable social bene…ts, primarily compensation for unemployment, sickness and early retirement. Data was calculated from the LINDA data set for the years 1992 to
2002. LINDA-a register-based longitudinal data set, which consists of a large panel of individuals, which is representative for the population from 1960 and onwards. The data set covers 3.35%
of the Swedish population (more then 300,000 individuals plus their household members) and is described in Edin and Fredriksson (2000) and has recently received attention cf. Calvet et al (2006) , Campbell (2006) and Flood (2003) .
The data was divided into six non-intersecting groups de…ned by educational attainment and sex. The predictable component of labour income was estimated separately for each group and the regressors include dummy variables for marital status and age as well as the number of children in four age-intervals. Table A .1 presents some parameter estimates for the most numerous group-Men with High-school
Individual parameters
For the reference case we used a standard set of assumptions regarding, the individual parameters.
First, we set the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion-to 5 and the discount factor-to 0.98,and the bequest parameter-b is set to 1, making consumption and bequest equally important in the …nal year. The survival probabilities p are sex dependent and taken from the Swedish life insurers when underwriting new policies, i.e. they are forward looking.
Assets and correlations
We set the risk-free aftertax rate-r f to 1:5%, consistent with the present gross return of less than 2% for long-dated index-linked bonds. The mean after tax equity premium e is set to 3%, which is low when compared with the historical average, but corresponds well with forward-looking estimates
Claus and Thomas (2001); Fama and French (2002) ). Volatility was set to 17% for the risky asset.
Following Cocco et al. (2005) , we then estimated the correlation % k between group-speci…c permanent labour income shocks k and lagged equity returns 1 .to estimate (cf. Table A.1). To keep the value of the N DC account within "reasonable" limits, we arbitrarily restricted the equity exposure from the Shiller-swap to 20% of the account. We also set the growth in average labour income l to 1:8%, the estimate used by the Swedish National Social Insurance Board. Finally, initial wealth z was set to 47, the mean wealth for individuals between the ages of 20 and 23.
RESULTS
To study the potential outcomes generated by the model; we simulated individual behaviour from age 20, by generating 30,000 random trajectories through time. Subject to the stochastic experience, the individual will choose a response, de…ned by the policy functions in Equation (2.20) (shares of consumption, risky assets and Shiller swaps), that describe the optimal state dependent behaviour.
International pricing of Shiller-swaps
As a reference, we plot the averages of the simulated trajectories for cash on hand ( Figure we do not expect these pro…les to be more than marginally di¤erent. However, the risk exposure of the N DC account is completely changed. In the Figure A .6, we plot the pro…le for the average size of the N DC account together with the hedged amount of aggregate wage risk for an internationally priced swap. Prior to mid-life the agent is constrained by our arbitrary rule of a maximum equity exposure in the N DC account of 20%. Before retirement, the individual hedge not only the N DC account, but also the discounted expected value of both the de…ned bene…t contract and future wages. When the de…ned bene…t pension is …xed at retirement and future wages are zero, the agent still continues to hedge the discounted expected value of the N DC account.
Inter-generational pricing of Shiller-swaps
To investigate the potential demand for Shiller-swaps from domestic investors only trading with their N DC accounts as collateral, we increased the swap premium-s (Equation (2.16)) with 10; 15 and 25bp (basis points) respectively, in addition to what an international investor requires. The higher risky share does not fully compensate for the negative equity-exposure in the N DC account, as is demonstrated in Figure A .2, which shows total equity exposure from both private savings and the N DC account. In early life, the agent tries to maximise the equity exposure (subject to our constraint of 20%), irrespective of the premium. Later in life and as private savings increase, the increased swap-premium make the agent more inclined to sell the Shiller-swap.
For the single agent belonging to this group and with these preferences (risk aversion); the 15bp additional swap premium would approximately "clear" the demand and supply across the individuals age; increasing the premium further would create excess supply. We can therefore expect thatif overall demand and supply is una¤ected by individual di¤erences in risk-aversion-a Shiller-swap market could be established within the N DC framework without resorting to an international market.
Changing the relative risk aversion from 5 to 2 or to 10 has only a minor e¤ect on preference for Shillerswap exposure (cf. Figure A .5), whereas the same changes in risk aversion have a dramatic impact on the risky weight (cf. Figure A .4).
[Insert …g A.5 and A.4 here]
As long as individuals are risk-averse, and with the expected risk premium-s and multiple-; set so that the Shiller-swap has zero expected return ( cf. Equation (2.17)), there will still be demand for the Shiller-swap, but for hedging perspective; whereas the demand for risky assets are primarily motivated by higher expected returns.
CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS
In a life-cycle model of a borrowing-constrained individuals'consumption-and portfolio-choice in the presence of uncertain labour income and realistically calibrated tax and pension systems-where the pension scheme consists of both a de…ned bene…t and notionally de…ned contribution parts, the latter indexed to stochastic aggregate labour income growth. The introduction of a Shiller-swap to mandatory individual pension accounts would allow individuals to bene…cially swap wage-and equityrisk.
Although such a market has not yet been established, an increase in the premium of only 15bp
would create domestic demand and supply for this swap, by individuals at di¤erent ages. It would therefore be possible to create such a market among individuals within the pension system, thereby 
